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The debate around public versus private health care often turns on cost – that is, on how
to reduce costs, and particularly government expenditures, when it comes to health care.
Proponents of private health care often claim that the private sector is more efficient and
therefore more cost-effective (Challinor 2016, 18;). In arguing that public health care costs are
unsustainable, they imply that the private sector will deliver better results at lower cost, usually
citing private sector innovation as the relevant difference between the two forms of provision
(Challinor 2016, 13). For instance, in a 2016 white paper from the Ontario Chamber of
Commerce, the author argues that two of the main challenges facing Ontario’s health system are
“unsustainable growth in government health costs that is being managed by artificially limiting
spending growth, rather than increasing efficiency” and “a fertile health and life sciences sector
that… has too few opportunities to bring their innovations to market” (Challinor 2016, 5).
The validity of such claims is difficult to measure, as every country’s health care system
has its own unique characteristics and there are many ways in which public and private actors
collaborate to deliver health services. However, the COVID-19 pandemic offers a unique
opportunity for cross-country analysis: the same public health crisis, happening at the same time,
across nearly every country in the world. As such, it is possible that any patterns which emerge
from such analysis could point to underlying differences between private and public health care
more broadly. In addition, national health care systems now operate in a world characterized by
the frequent emergence of globe-spanning infectious disease. As Margaret Chan, former director
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general of the WHO wrote in 2007, “Population growth, incursion into previously uninhabited
areas, rapid urbanization, intensive farming practices, environmental degradation, and the misuse
of antimicrobials have disrupted the equilibrium of the microbial world,” resulting in a situation
in which “new diseases are emerging at the historically unprecedented rate of one per year”
(WHO 2007, vi). Thus, the study of how differently organized health care systems have reacted
to the COVID-19 pandemic is both timely and appropriate to the public/private health care
debate. With these considerations in mind, this paper contributes to this debate by examining the
theoretical and empirical relationship between health costs and health outcomes in the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic. It proposes an alternative political economic framework – capital-as-
power (hereafter CasP) – for understanding how the provision of health care affects the
relationship between health care costs and health outcomes, arguing that private health care
realizes profits through the strategic limitation of health services. It presents empirical evidence
suggesting that in countries which rely more heavily on private health care, higher overall health
care expenditures predict more severe COVID-19 outbreaks, contradicting the argument that
private health care services are more cost-efficient or will lead to better health outcomes at a
lower cost.
The paper is divided into four sections. First, I explain how the CasP theoretical approach
differs from conventional health economics in its analysis of the logic of business, in arguing that
profit accrues through the strategic limitation of industrial capacity. In the health care sector, this
occurs in three general ways: by redirecting resources from essential and widely used services to
only the most profitable services; by reducing capacity; and in times of crisis, by raising prices
and refusing to treat patients who cannot afford to pay. In the second section, I give qualitative
evidence from Italy and India showing how each of these limitations occurred leading up to and
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during the pandemic, exacerbating its effects. Third, I explain the methodology behind the
quantitative analysis and address limitations to the data. Fourth, I present the results of the study,
which suggest that as private provision of health care expands, overall health care expenditures
become positively correlated with more severe COVID-19 outbreaks. From the perspective of
private sector proponents, this result makes little sense, as greater private sector input is
understood to lower costs and improve health. From a CasP perspective, however, the result
makes perfect sense: higher costs and worse outcomes are twin expressions of the strategic
limitation of health care provision by private business.
Two approaches to the logic of business: neo-classical and capital-as-power
In the conventional view of health economics, markets are understood as more efficient
in allocating resources than the government, because competition between private actors is
assumed to increase efficiency and lower costs (Rosenthal and Newbrander 1996, 207-208). The
government, on the other hand, lacking competitors, has little incentive to lower costs or become
more efficient (Gerdtham, Søgaard, Andersson, and Jönsson 1992, 6). As James Capretta and
Kevin Dayaratna (2013) of the Heritage Foundation write, “a market-driven health system would
work as one would expect it to—driving out waste and inefficiency and rewarding high quality
and lower costs with greater market share.” From this point of view, in a health system with
greater reliance on private sector health care, increased competition (both between private
providers and between private providers and the government) will increase efficiency, resulting
in the same or better health outcomes at a lower cost.
In addition, proponents of private health care argue that if health care users were forced
to pay more for health care, they would also use health care services more efficiently (Nix and
Senger 2012). For instance, Kathryn Nix and Alyene Senger (2012) argue that US health care
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costs are high because users “are insulated from the cost of health care.” Similarly, citing a
RAND study by the economist Joseph Newhouse, Dayaratna (2013) argues that health care users
“overconsume” health care when it is offered for free. When costs are shared between insurers
and users, on the other hand, users are more careful about accessing services, reducing
unnecessary costs (Dayaratna 2013). In sum, private health care is more efficient for two reasons.
First, the introduction of open-ended financial incentives leads private firms to develop more
efficient systems, pocketing the difference in profit. However, the gains made from increasing
efficiency supposedly out-weigh the share of income which is not reinvested in expanded
production. Second, placing a higher cost burden on individuals causes them to think more
carefully about what health services they really need, reducing unnecessary (and thus wasteful)
consumption of health care.
The CasP approach, developed by Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, takes a
different perspective. Building on the insights of the early twentieth century sociologist
Thorstein Veblen, Nitzan and Bichler (2009, 233-235) argue that business profits are realized not
through ‘added-value’, but through the strategic limitation, or ‘sabotage’, of industrial capacity
and human wellbeing. This limitation is usually only partial, as too great a degree of sabotage
causes excess stagnation and lower earnings (237). In effect, the normal run of business is to
charge only “what the traffic will bear” (Veblen 1908, 107). Because the expectation of a
‘normal’ rate of return on investment is all but accepted as natural in capitalist societies, this
partial limitation on the full utilization of industrial capacity becomes largely invisible – a
mundane ‘cost of doing business’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 242).
Nitzan and Bichler (2009, 233) argue that this limitation by business interests takes two
broad forms. The first, and harder to empirically measure, is the shaping and redirecting of
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industry toward more profitable ends. In the health care sector, this may take the form of the
development of expensive pharmaceuticals of questionable utility, or of allocating hospital
resources away from essential services like emergency rooms and toward only the most
profitable and specialized services (235). The second, and more easily observable form of
limitation is the systematic under-utilization of capacity (235). One such limitation relevant to
our discussion would be the fewer numbers of hospital beds found in private hospitals relative to
their public counterparts (Buzelli and Boyce 2021, 502).
Qualitative evidence of health care industry limitations by business
This section uses the examples of Italy and India to illustrate how, leading up to and
during the pandemic, health care businesses strategically limited the provision of health care in
the two general ways described above, exacerbating the outcome of the pandemic in those areas.
In a recent paper, Maria Luisa Buzelli and Tammy Boyce (2021, 501) argue that “the
privatization of the NHS contributed to making Italy more vulnerable and unprepared to tackle
the COVID-19 pandemic.” They note that over the last decade, Italy has simultaneously pursued
a strategy of cost-cutting and encouraging the expansion of private health care across the country,
leading to a large reduction in public health services and to increased reliance on the private
sector (502). These policies directly amplified the severity of the pandemic in Italy. While these
policies can also be viewed as an effort by the Italian government to make private health care
more profitable, private health services providers themselves also contributed to the crisis in a
number of ways which, from a CasP perspective, can be conceptualized as forms of strategic
limitation or ‘sabotage’ (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 223).
First, private health care providers shape the health care industry by directing resources
toward more profitable services and away from less profitable ones. Buzelli and Boyce (2021,
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502) write that “private hospitals in Italy provide a limited range of services compared to public
hospitals,” which “ensure the private sector high returns.” These services include “diagnostic
procedures (e.g., laboratory tests), pharmaceuticals, specialist outpatient care, nonurgent
interventions, residential care, and rehabilitation assistance,” for which the hospitals are able to
charge high prices because of their specialized nature (502). Plagg (2021, 3988) notes that while
Lombardy “has been increasingly investing in specialist medical care,” it has only .74 primary
care physicians (GPs) per 1000 residents, half the number of France or Germany. Despite having
the highest average gross salary of any region, highly privatised Lombardy saw excess mortality
rates 5 times higher than neighboring Veneto in the early months of the pandemic (Varella 2021;
Plagg 2021, 3988). Public hospitals, on the other hand, “provide a broader range of health
services,” including “almost all emergency care in Italy” (Buzelli and Boyce 2021, 502). The
private sector focus on high margin services to the exclusion of other health services essential to
public well-being places a heavier burden on public services, for instance when emergency
rooms are used for non-urgent health concerns because they provide care free of charge (Plagg
2021, 3988). This has the effect of undermining the overall capacity of the health system.
Second, Buzelli and Boyce (2021, 502) note that private hospitals in Italy contain fewer
hospital beds on average. In Lombardy, private hospitals have less than a third of the hospital
beds as public hospitals, despite their greater number (502). In the whole country, “public
hospitals provided 107,435 more beds than the private health sector, despite there being only 36
more public hospitals compared to private facilities” (503). In this case, the lower bed count can
be understood as intentional under-utilization, the second form of limitation. The issue is not a
physical lack of beds per se – the Italian public hospital system eliminated almost 20,000 beds
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between 2010-2017 – but that a reduction of service below full utilization is a basic precondition
for profit (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 236).
India is much more heavily reliant on private sector health care than Italy (Thiagarajan
2020, 1). There are more than twice the number of private hospitals as public, and over 80% of
the population is uninsured (1). While public health care treatment is free, lack of funding and
varying quality of care “serves to drive desperate patients towards private care” (1). Despite the
clear need for health services during a pandemic, overcharging has been rampant and corporate
hospitals have strongly resisted efforts to cap prices for COVID-19 treatment or offer free or
subsidized services (1). Commenting on the widespread failure of private health care in India,
Williams (2020, 3) writes that the country “has been particularly plagued by private hospitals
refusing treatment as the public hospital systems in many states have been overrun” and that
“patients have died, sometimes outside hospital doors, after failing to gain admission to multiple
hospitals.” Despite emergency actions by municipal, state and the national government,
including the “sequestration of hospitals, enforced openings, prosecution and other measures,”
Williams reports that firms were still “routinely breaching price caps and gouging, turning away
COVID patients and hoarding beds” through September 2020, when the article was written (3).
The widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of private sector involvement in health care
by international organizations like the World Bank and WHO has led to the argument that such
behaviour is an unavoidable outcome of the crisis, rather than an inherent feature of capital
accumulation (Hellowell 2020). For instance, in the WHO’s report on “Supporting Private
Sector Engagement During COVID-19: WHO’s Approach,” senior health system advisor David
Clarke argues that “emergency legislation, compounded by weak health systems and regulation,
can limit the private sector’s role,” ignoring the role that emergency legislation played, not in
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limiting, but in greatly expanding the private sector role, including by legally forcing the private
sector to provide emergency services – not only in India, but in many countries including
Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Egypt (WHO 2020, 3; Williams 2020, 3).
From a CasP perspective, however, the behaviour of private health care providers in India is
hardly surprising. As Nitzan and Bichler (2009, 378) point out, stagflation, or generalized price
inflation in combination with the reduction of industrial capacity, goes hand in hand with social
crises. In the case of India’s private hospitals, the pandemic provided an opportunity for an
extraordinary level of sabotage of the provision of essential health care. To be fair, one could
argue that many of these businesses had no choice but to raise prices and limit treatments to
offset loss of revenues. Yet such an argument affirms the fundamental nature of the relationship
between profit and provision: regardless of their ‘necessity,’ profits could only be realized
through strategic limitations on provision of care. The greater the crisis, the greater the ‘need’ for
private health care providers to sabotage health care provision to remain profitable.
Methodology and limitations of quantitative study
One major issue facing any quantitative comparison of health care systems during the
pandemic is that health care systems are only one factor in determining the pandemic’s effects.
Social welfare provisions, government emergency responses, and cultural attitudes and practices,
to name just a few factors, all had a role to play in the severity of the impact of COVID-19. For
instance, high death tolls in countries like the US have been perceived to be the result, not of a
failure of the health care system, but of government policy (Altman 2020). The inability to
control for such factors is an inevitable limitation on this kind of single-factor analysis.
Nonetheless, because the health care system remains of central importance in mitigating the
effects of the pandemic, differences in health systems are likely to have had a substantive impact.
9
A second difficulty is that public and private provision of health care are highly
integrated in most, if not all countries, making analysis of public and private health care as
wholly separate entities difficult. In one systematic comparison of the performance of private and
public health sectors, the authors note that both the funding and organization of national health
care systems includes both private and public actors in diverse ways making even the definition
of what is public and what is private far from straightforward (Basu et al. 2012, 2). A further and
related difficulty is that there is little data on the distribution of services and resources between
public and private sectors on the country-by-country basis needed for this particular study. As a
result, and reflecting the limited scope of the study, inferences about the public/private makeup
of individual countries will have to be approximate. Mackintosh et al. (2016, 2) provides three
metrics for determining the makeup of a mixed system: “the extent and pattern of private finance
within health-care expenditure as a whole (demand side); the scale and level of the private sector
enterprises in health care, indicated by their weight in the use of ambulatory and primary, and
clinic-based and secondary, care (supply side); and the accessibility of the public sector, proxied
by the extent to which the public provision relies on fees (commercialisation).” Due its limited
scope, and the accessibility of data on private health finance, this paper uses the first metric for
quantitative analysis.
In addition, past studies comparing private and public provision of health care often focus
narrowly on either quality-of-care metrics or efficiency, without directly addressing the
connections between the two and how these relate to overall health. In particular, focusing on the
quality of care within one type of service says little about how such conditions affect broader
health outcomes. For instance, private health care services might in some instances provide
higher quality care, but because access is limited to those who can afford it, there is no way to
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measure the overall adverse health effects of this exclusion. In a meta-analysis of 80 studies,
Berendes et al. (2011, 4) found that private sector care in low- and middle-income countries
scored substantially higher than the public sector on drug availability. However, they did not
consider how greater drug availability might also reflect greater inequities in drug access. If drug
availability is maintained at high prices, then the greater availability of those drugs in private
facilities does not necessarily translate to better health outcomes for the wider population.
On the other side, studies measuring the efficiency of health care providers often fail to
sufficiently relate efficiency to better health. For example, one framework that is commonly used
in the hospital sector, data envelopment analysis (DEA), measures efficiency simply as the ratio
of inputs to outputs of a given provider (Tiemann and Schreyögg 2009, 120). Inputs refer to costs
like labour and supplies, while output refers to a technical factor like the number of patients
served or the length of patient stays. This kind of simple technical efficiency says little about the
quality of care or actual health outcomes, and indeed, there appears to be a trade-off between
efficiency and quality of care. Tiemann and Schreyögg (2009, 119) cite several studies which
found that efficiency measured in this way is positively correlated with inpatient mortality. In
their own study, Tiemann and Schreyögg ‘avoid’ this issue by using “average mortality rates per
year in each hospital” to “adjust for variations in the quality of care between hospitals” (120).
However, by controlling for quality of care, they still manage to remove it from their equations,
detaching the gains of cost-efficiency from any understanding of whether or not health outcomes
were improved or impaired.
In order to compare efficiency – conceived in this paper as the connection between cost
and health outcomes – between private and public sector health care, this paper takes a two-step
approach. First, using the measure of the distribution of public and private domestic health
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expenditures, countries were divided into two groups: those with higher public funding of health
care, and those with higher private funding. While private expenditures do not necessarily denote
private ownership of health care services, this division is intended to approximate the division
between those countries in which government plays a strong role in directing and funding health
care, from those in which the population must rely to a much greater extent on the private sector.
While somewhat speculative, there is evidence that this is at least approximately the case. For
instance, Basu et al. (2012, 9) note that a study in China found that the privatization of health
services led to a significant increase in out-of-pocket expenditures. Moreover, while some
government-run health services also rely on out-of-pocket expenditures, as in Armenia, such an
approach often exists alongside a large private health sector (Torosyan, Romoniuk, and
Krajewski-Suida 2007, 189). Finally, private spending captures an important aspect of private
health care – private insurance. As financial intermediaries, private health insurance providers
are key gatekeepers, not only of access to health care, but of financing for the operations of
health care providers themselves. As Mackintosh et al. (2016, 2) state, “The extent of each type
of private finance is a proxy indicator of the characteristics of the private supply sector, since
private insurance generally funds larger licensed private providers, whereas much out-of-pocket
spending funds smaller scale, often unlicensed, provision.” On the other hand, they also note that
“out-of-pocket spending also includes fees for public services and medicine purchases” (2-3). In
sum, though there are many links between private spending and reliance on the private health
care sector, the approximation of one for the other must be considered tentative and exploratory.
In the second step, the statistical correlation between overall health expenditures prior to the
pandemic and cumulative COVID-19 deaths within each group of countries was measured. This
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measurement is intended to measure the cost-efficiency of private and public-led health care
systems in terms of outcome – namely, in terms of the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The data
The data are gathered from two sources. The COVID-19 data is from John Hopkins
University, which has aggregated a number of sources together to track COVID-19 globally,
accessed from the 91-DIVOC Project. The health expenditures data is from the World Bank
Open Data Project. To control for population size and wealth, both data sets are normalized by
population and results: the death rate is per 100,000 people; total health expenditures are
measured as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP); and private and public domestic
health care expenditures are measured as a percentage of total health expenditures. Health
expenditure data is from 2018, the most recent year available.
I chose death rate normalized by population over case-fatality – the other primary
measure of COVID-19 impacts – for three reasons. First, while the case-fatality rate reflects one
measure of the deadliness of the pandemic, the death count gives a broader sense of the severity
of the outbreak, because a country could have a high mortality rate with relatively few total cases.
Second, the case-fatality rate data is not cumulative, and can fluctuate quite dramatically over
time. These fluctuations have many causes, including data collection irregularities. Countries that
had early outbreaks had extremely high case-fatality rates which later dropped. Therefore, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to know which case-fatality rate accurately reflects the ‘true’
deadliness of the pandemic in a given country. Finally, there is the issue of “potential biases in
reporting fatalities and the number of infections” (Ozkan et al. 2021, 2). In their cross-country
COVID-19 study, Ozkan et al. (2021, 2) prefer case-fatality to number of deaths because the
measure “is [more] likely to moderate this bias given both the numerator and the denominator
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are likely to be lower than their true unobserved values.” However, this only holds true if both
death and case counts are lower by a similar amount, and across all countries in the study, neither
of which is known. On the other hand, even if it does hold, the fact that the study is analyzing the
correlation between different country data obviates the need for accurate absolute levels, whether
the measure is case-fatality or overall death. It merely requires that the bias does not vary too
much between countries. Thus, on the principle of Occam’s razor, I use the simpler measure of
cumulative deaths.
The date from which I chose to measure the cumulative death rate was December 31,
2020 – mid-way through the first major global peak of the pandemic. I chose this date because it
was late enough that the pandemic had spread to a suitably large number of countries for
comparison, but still early enough that the data would reflect accurately the performance of the
already existing health systems (i.e., a snapshot unlikely to be substantially affected by
governments’ emergency funding responses to the crisis).
There are a few other considerations worth noting. Countries were removed from the
dataset for one of two reasons: because they were missing either death data or health
expenditures data, or because they relied on more than 10% health funding from external (i.e.,
non-domestic) sources. Finally, I removed 4 outliers: the U.S., Sierra Leone, and Monaco for
outlying total health expenditures; and Peru, for an outlying death count. The resulting sample
size of the study was 115 countries.
Results
In figures 1 and 2, the x-axis denotes cumulative COVID-19 deaths per 100,00 people,
while the y-axis denotes total health care expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Figure 1 shows
the countries in which private spending is more than 50% of total health expenditures, while
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figure 2 shows the countries in which private spending is less than 50%. In figure 1, there is a
very high positive correlation between health spending and COVID-19 deaths, while in figure 2
there is little or no correlation. Table 1 shows three additional disaggregate measures which
break down the role of out-of-pocket and other private expenditures. In each, the same pattern
emerges, suggesting that once private spending, whether out-of-pocket or otherwise, becomes the
main source of health expenditures, higher overall expenditures become a predictor of worse
COVID-19 outbreaks (note that the health expenditure data is from 2018).
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Table 1. Statistical correlations between COVID-19 deaths, normalized by




Countries for which out-of-pocket expenditures exceeded
50% of total health expenditures
0.78 0.61
Countries for which out-of-pocket expenditures did not
exceed 50% of total health expenditures
0.33 0.11
Countries for which other private (i.e., non-out-of-pocket)
expenditures exceeded 15% of total health expenditures
0.72 0.52
Countries for which other private (i.e., non-out-of-pocket) expenditures did
not exceed 15% of total health expenditures
0.36 0.13
Countries for which the ratio of other private (i.e., non-out-of-pocket) expenditures to
government expenditures was greater than 20% (see figure 3)
0.77 0.60
Countries for which the ratio of other private (i.e., non-out-of-pocket) expenditures to
government expenditures was less than 20% (see figure 4)
0.27 0.08
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Figures 3 and 4 show the third disaggregated grouping from table 1 – countries grouped
by the ratio of non-out-of-pocket private expenditures to public expenditures. This way of
grouping countries may get closest to approximating relative private health care provision
because private insurance is the most significant portion of “other” private expenditures. In the
US for instance, 82.5% of non-out-of-pocket private expenditures come from private insurers
(CMS Financial Report 2021, 2). As noted by Mackintosh et al. (2016, 2), this should indicate
the general proportion of private health care supply (note that the overall level is not important,
only the accuracy of the general division of countries into those with health care systems more or
less dominated by the private sector).
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Figures 3 and 4 show similar correlations to figures 1 and 2, reinforcing the original
results. In addition, the set of countries in which the ratio of private non-out-of-pocket spending
to public spending is above 20% includes an even more diverse array of countries than the
grouping based on overall private funding, including several high-income countries. This
suggests that the correlation holds outside of low- and middle-income countries.
Even when COVID-19 death data is measured from a later date (September 19, 2021) for
comparison, the correlations between deaths and overall health expenditures remain strongly
positive. For instance, among countries in which private health expenditures exceed 50% of total
health spending, the correlation is .67. Among countries in which the ratio of non-out-of-pocket
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expenditures to public expenditures is greater than 20%, the correlation is .74. For the opposing
groups of countries, the correlations are .26 and .22, respectively.
The results also show weak or no correlation between overall health spending and
COVID-19 deaths amongst countries with proportionately high public sector health care
expenditures. This could be because, all things remaining the same, strong government control
over health care limited the impact of health care spending levels on the pandemic’s severity. It
could also mean that government-dominated health care sector provision exhibits more varied
levels of efficiency. Here, further study is needed to draw any solid conclusions. One starting
point might be using a more detailed taxonomy of mixed health care systems in which to group
countries, such as that articulated in Mackintosh et al. (2016, 3).
In sum, the tight correlation between spending and COVID-19 deaths in private-payer
dominated countries suggests that private health care is neither ‘more efficient’ nor provides
better health outcomes, at least in the context of a public health emergency. The results of this
study are far from conclusive, particularly because the relationship between private health
expenditures and the size of a country’s private health care sector is still speculative. If we grant
this assumption, however, this result conforms to an understanding of private health care
provision based on a CasP perspective. As private control over health care increases, there is a
corresponding increase in the portion of overall health expenditures representing profit. If profit
is a negative quantity, representing not provision of health care but its strategic limitation, then in
the countries in which private control has reached a certain level of dominance, health
expenditures will increasingly correlate with limitations on health care (in the more or less subtle
ways described in section two). From this view, the positive correlation between COVID-19
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deaths and health care expenditures reflects two empirical expressions of the same process: the
increasing control of business interests over a country’s health care system.
Even if we don’t grant a connection between the size of the private health sector and the
proportion of private expenditure, the data also runs against the second argument made by
private health care proponents, that forcing health care users to shoulder a greater portion of the
costs of health care will result in more efficient use of resources. As table 1 shows, the high
positive correlation between higher expenditures and higher COVID-19 deaths remains even
when out-of-pocket expenditures are disaggregated.
Conclusion
The relationship between expenditures and outcomes in private and public health care is
no doubt complex. Because of this complexity, accurate and nuanced information about the
interaction of public and private sector health care should be a top priority for researchers,
governments, and international organizations. Unfortunately, there is still very little data on
private health care sector involvement in health care, particularly in low- and middle-income
countries. In addition, the interaction between health care systems and larger institutions of
power needs to be examined outside of the common framework of high-, low-, and middle-
income countries. As of this writing, total COVID-19 deaths per 100,000 in the EU remain
almost twice that of the global average (Fagen-Ulmschneider 2021). Moreover, wealthy
countries with a high ratio of private spending to public spending, including France, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the US, all have high overall health care expenditure and high
death rates. This suggests that the study of the interaction between public and private health care,
health care spending and health outcomes should not be confined to Global North/South
conceptual divisions. While this paper produced only tentative results, the evidence gathered
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points to a conflict of interest in private health care between profit and public health. As the
pandemic has tragically revealed, the cost of this conflict, whether counted in dollars or lives, is
unsustainable.
References
Altman, Drew. 2020. “Understanding the US Failure on coronavirus.” British Medical Journal
370. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1136/bmj.m3417.
Basu, Sanjay, Jason Andrews, Sandeep Kishore, Rajesh Panjabi, and David Stuckler. 2012.
“Comparative Performance of Private and Public Healthcare systems in Low- and Middle-
Income Countries: A Systemic Review. PLoS Medicine 9, no. 6. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001244.
Berendes, Sima, Peter Heywood, Sandy Oliver, and Paul Garner. 2011. “Quality of Private and
Public Ambulatory Health Care in Low and Middle Income Countries: Systematic Review of
Comparative Studies. PLoS Medicine 8, no.4. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1371/journal.pmed.1000433.
Buzelli, Maria Luisa, and Tammy Boyce. 2021. “The Privatization of the Italian National Health
System and its Impact on Health Emergency Preparedness and Response: The COVID-19
Case.” International Journal of Health 51, no. 4: 501-508. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1177%2F00207314211024900.
Capretta, James, and Kevin Dayaratna. 2013. “Compelling Evidence Makes the Case for a
Market-Driven Health Care System.” The Heritage Foundation. Accessed November 26,
2021. https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/compelling-evidence-makes-the-
case-market-driven-health-care-system.
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 2021. CMS Financial Report for Fiscal Year 2021.
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/cms-financial-report-fiscal-year-2021.pdf.
Challinor, Ashley. 2016. “Transformation through value and innovation.” Ontario Chamber of
Commerce. https://books.scholarsportal.info/en/read?id=/ ebooks/ebooks0/gibson_cppc-
chrc/2016-05-25/1/10049515.
Fagen-Ulmschneider, Wade. 2021. 91-DIVOC Project. Accessed November 29. https://91-
divoc.com/pages/covid-visualization/.
Gerdtham, Ulf, Jes Søgaard, Fredrik Andersson, and Bengt Jönsson. 1992. “An econometric
analysis of health care expenditure: A cross-section study of the OECD countries.” Journal
of Health Economics 11, no.1 (May): 63-84. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1016/0167-6296(92)90025-V.
22
Hellowell, Mark. 2020. “Covid-19 and the collapse of the private health sector: a threat to
countries’ response efforts and the future of health systems strengthening?” Global Health
Policy Unit. Accessed November 26, 2021. https://ghpu.sps.ed.ac.uk/covid-19-and-the-
collapse-of-the-private-health-sector-a-threat-to-countries-response-efforts-and-the-future-of-
health-systems-strengthening/.
Mackintosh, Maureen, Amoc Channon, Anup Karan, Sakthivel Selvaraj, Eleonora Cavagnero,
and Hongwen Zhao. 2016. “What is the private sector? Understanding private provision in
the health systems of low-income and middle-income countries.” The Lancet 388, no.10044
(August): 596-605. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)00342-1.
Nitzan, Jonathan, and Shimshon Bichler. 2009. Capital as Power. A Study of Order and
Creorder. RIPE Series in Global Political Economy. New York and London: Routledge.
Nix, Kathryn, and Alyene Senger. “The Promise of Consumer-Directed Health Plans: Studies
Show Success at Reducing Costs and Maintaining Quality.” The Heritage Foundation.
Accessed November 26, 2021. https://www.heritage.org/node/12272/print-display.
Oksan, Aydin, Gulcin Oksan, Abdullah Yalaman, Yilmaz Yildiz. 2021. “Climate risk, culture
and the Covid-19 mortality: A cross-country analysis.” World Development 141 (January).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105412.
Plagg, Barbara, Guiliano Piccoliori, Jörg Oschmann, Adolf Engl, and Klaus Eisendle. “Primary
Health Care and Hospital Management During COVID-19: Lessons from Lombardy.” Risk
Management and Healthcare Policy 14: 3987-3992. https://doi-
org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.2147/RMHP.S315880.
Rosenthal, Gerald, and William Newbrander. 1996. “Public Policy and Private Sector Provision
of Health Services.” International Journal of Health Planning and Management 11, no. 3:
203-216. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1002/(SICI)1099-
1751(199607)11:3%3C203::AID-HPM432%3E3.0.CO;2-0.
Thiagarajan, Kamala. 2020. “Covid-19 exposes the high cost of India’s reliance on private
healthcare.” British Medical Journal 370 (September). http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.m3506.
Tiemann, Oliver, and Jonas Schreyögg. 2009. “Effects of Ownership on Hospital Efficiency in
Germany.” Business Research; Göttingen 2, no. 2 (December): 115-145.
http://ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-
journals/effects-ownership-on-hospital-efficiency-germany/docview/199310002/se-2.
Torosyan, Arsen, Piotr Romaniuk, and Krzysztof Krajewski-Siuda. 2008. “The Armenian
Healthcare System: Recent Changes and Challenges.” Journal of Public Health 16, no. 3
(May): 183–90. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/10.1007/s10389-007-0160-y.
Varella, Simona. 2021. “Average annual gross salary in Italy in 2020, by region.” Statista.




Veblen, Thorstein. 1908. On the Nature of Capital: Investment, Intangible Assets, and the
Pecuniary Magnate. Quarterly Journal of Economics XXII (1, November): 104-136.
Williams, Owain David. 2020. “COVID-19 and Private Health: Market and Governance
Failure.” Development (Society for International Development) 63, no. 2-4: 181-190.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41301-020-00273-x.
World Health Organization. 2007. “The World Health Report 2007: A Safer Future.”
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789241563444.
World Health Organization. 2020. “Supporting private sector engagement during COVID019 –
WHO’s approach.” https://apo.who.int/publications/i/item/supporting-private-sector-
engagement-during-covid-19-who-s-approach.
